The high frequency of modern travel has led to concerns about a devastating pandemic 18 since a lethal pathogen strain could spread worldwide quickly. Many historical 19 pandemics have arisen following pathogen evolution to a more virulent form. However, 20 some pathogen strains invoke immune responses that provide partial cross-immunity 21 against infection with related strains. Here, we consider a mathematical model of 22 KEYWORDS 33 major epidemic; antigenic variation; cross-immunity; pathogen diversity; mathematical 34 modelling 35 36
successive outbreaks of two strains -a low virulence strain outbreak followed by a high 23 virulence strain outbreak. Under these circumstances, we investigate the impacts of 24 varying travel rates and cross-immunity on the probability that a major epidemic of the 25 high virulence strain occurs, and the size of that outbreak. Frequent travel between 26 subpopulations can lead to widespread immunity to the high virulence strain, driven by 27 exposure to the low virulence strain. As a result, major epidemics of the high virulence 28
strain are less likely, and can potentially be smaller, with more connected 29
subpopulations. Cross-immunity may be a factor contributing to the absence of a global 30 pandemic as severe as the 1918 influenza pandemic in the century since. 31
INTRODUCTION 37 38
Outbreaks of infectious disease are responsible for around 14 million deaths annually 39 [1, 2] . In recent years, there have been a number of epidemics that have sparked fears 40 that a global pandemic might develop [3] . Outbreaks such as the Ebola 41 epidemic in West Africa did not develop into a global pandemic [4] . Other outbreaks, for 42 example the 2009 H1N1 influenza pandemic, have included cases in countries 43 worldwide [5], but have not been as destructive as initially feared [6] . Historically, 44 however, there have been severe global pandemics. The 1918 'Spanish flu' pandemic 45 killed around 50 million people [7] , and the 1958 and 1968 influenza pandemics caused 46 around one million deaths each [8, 9] . These outcomes viewed collectively raise a 47 number of questions: how likely is a global pandemic now, and has the lack of a 48 devastating global pandemic in recent years been simply a matter of luck? 49 50 A number of factors affect the pandemic potential when a pathogen first appears in a 51 host population. These include the spatial distribution of hosts and the level of mixing 52 between subpopulations [10, 11] . When a pathogen enters a population, a high host 53 density within subpopulations and a high contact rate between subpopulations are most 54 likely to represent appropriate conditions for a major epidemic and lead to high epidemic 55 growth rates [12] [13] [14] [15] . The modern world increasingly satisfies these conditions, with 56 growing population sizes and large numbers of individuals living in urban centres, as 57 well as the high frequency of worldwide airline travel [16] . Hence, one might expect the 58 probability of a global pandemic, as well as its potential severity, to be at an all-time 59
high. 60
However, the determinants of the dynamics of infectious disease outbreaks are 62 numerous and the above assertions ignore an important feature: cross-immunity 63 obtained from pathogen exposures in previous outbreaks. Viral, bacterial and eukaryotic 64 pathogens, such as the influenza virus, Streptococcus pneumoniae and the malaria 65 parasite, evolve in an attempt to avoid control by the immune system [17, 18] and in 66 response to interventions such as vaccines [19] [20] [21] . Nonetheless, such immune evasion 67 is not perfect. Hosts that have been infected by a particular strain and acquired 68 immunity to that strain may also be at least partially cross-immune to infection with 69 related strains [22] [23] [24] [25] . Previous infections with immunologically related strains of a 70 pathogen can therefore be beneficial to hosts, as they might provide protection against 71 future infections with other potentially more virulent strains. 72
73
Cross-immunity between related pathogen strains has been shown to impact on 74 pathogen dynamics and the structures of pathogen populations [26, 27] . Cross-immunity 75 might also be expected to affect the threat of a major epidemic. The 2009 H1N1 76 outbreak, for example, was not as destructive as feared, potentially as a result of 77 decreased population susceptibility due to cross-immunity [28-31]. Here we develop a 78 mathematical model to investigate the impact of cross-immunity on the chance of a 79 major epidemic. We consider a general system emulating the dynamics of an outbreak 80 of a pathogen of high virulence in two connected subpopulations, when cross-immunity 81 is present from a previously circulating low virulence strain. We illustrate the principle 82 that high rates of travel between subpopulations can decrease the probability of a major 83 epidemic of a high virulence strain, and that the expected outbreak size can be either 84 increased or decreased when there is a higher rate of travel between subpopulations. In 85 a connected world, novel pathogens could spread worldwide through immunologically 86 naïve populations extremely quickly. However, epidemics of existing pathogens may be 87 less frequent, and potentially smaller, due to cross-immunity between pathogen strains 88 -an important, but previously underappreciated, factor. 89 90 91
RESULTS 92
Motivated by the spread of pathogens between geographically separate regions, we 94 considered pathogen transmission in a population consisting of two spatially distinct 95 subpopulations (Fig 1) . Two outbreaks were assumed to occur. First, an outbreak of a 96 low virulence (LV) strain of the pathogen that has the potential to generate a large 97 number of cases but that is unlikely to lead to a large number of deaths. Then, an 98 outbreak of a related high virulence (HV) strain of the pathogen. Individuals infected in 99 the first outbreak were partially cross-immune against infection in the second outbreak. We initially considered outbreak dynamics in a single population. When the HV strain 115 arrived in the population, its effective reproduction number was reduced if individuals 116 had previously been infected by the LV strain. The higher the cross-immunity (governed 117 by the level of cross-immunity, 0 ߙ 1 ), the lower the effective reproduction number 118 of the HV strain (Fig 2a) . The higher the basic reproduction number of the LV strain, 119 ܴ , the lower the expected effective reproduction number of the HV strain, since the LV 120 strain would then have been likely to have generated more cases, leading to increased 121 numbers of individuals partially cross-immune against the HV strain outbreak (Fig 2a) . 122
Similarly, when the HV strain arrived in the population, the probability of a major 124 epidemic (i.e. successful invasion of the host population) following decreased as the 125 level of cross-immunity increased (Fig 2b) , as did the final size of major epidemics of 126 the HV strain (Fig 2c) . The expected number of HV strain infections, accounting for the 127 possibility that outbreaks may fade-out without becoming major epidemics, also 128 decreased when the level of cross-immunity increased (Fig 2d) . Furthermore, these 129 quantities were also all reduced when the LV strain was more transmissible (see 
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The blue regions represent quantiles of simulations of major epidemics and the red 163 We then considered outbreak dynamics in two connected subpopulations and assessed 177 the impact of the extent of travel between subpopulations (governed by the parameter 178 ߣ ), as well as the inherent within-subpopulation transmissibility of the LV and HV strains 179 (governed by the parameter ߢ ), on outbreaks of the HV strain. We considered the 180 effects of these parameters on the probability of a major epidemic of the HV strain (Fig  181   4a-c) , the final size of an outbreak if a major epidemic is assumed to occur (Fig 4d-f) , 182 and the expected final size accounting for the fact that outbreaks can either fade out as 183 minor outbreaks or take off as major epidemics (Fig 4g-i) . We found that increased rates 184 of travel between subpopulations led to a lower probability of a major epidemic of the 185 HV strain. This is due to the probability of a major epidemic of the HV strain being 186 governed by local susceptibility when the HV strain first arrives in the population. Thus, 187 increased travel between subpopulations increases the probability that the LV strain has 188 previously caused an epidemic in the subpopulation where the HV strain arrives and 189 conferred some immunity against the HV strain in that subpopulation. The decreased 190 chance of a major epidemic when between-subpopulation travel was increased was 191 particularly pronounced when the strains driving the LV and HV epidemics were very 192 transmissible and the level of cross-immunity was high (see rightmost region of Fig 4c,  193 in which there is a large reduction in the probability of a major epidemic from the bottom 194 to the top of the figure) . 195
196
If the between-subpopulation connectivity was high when major epidemics occurred, 197
those epidemics tended to be more severe (Fig 4d-e ). This was not the case at very 198 high levels of cross-immunity (Fig 4f) . However, the expected total number of HV strain 199 infections, accounting for the possibility that the outbreak either took off and became a 200 major epidemic or faded out without spreading widely, was reduced as the extent of 201 between-subpopulation travel increased when the level of cross-immunity was high (e.g. 202 Fig 4h-i) , but increased for low levels of cross-immunity (Fig 4g) . 203
204
The outcome that the expected final size of major epidemics of the HV strain was 205 unaffected by between-subpopulation travel when the level of cross-immunity was high 206 (Fig 4f) can be explained as follows. The LV strain was assumed to always generate a 207 major epidemic in subpopulation 1. In that subpopulation, the cross-immunity conferred 208 was so high that a major epidemic of the HV strain could never occur in that 209 subpopulation. Consequently, the only way that a major epidemic of the HV could occur 210 in the overall population was if a major epidemic of the LV strain did not occur in 211 subpopulation 2, and the HV strain outbreak was seeded in subpopulation 2 and went 212 on to cause a major epidemic. Conditional on this scenario occurring, the size of that For a description of the parameters, see Table S2 .] 229
230
We also verified that our results in Fig 4, which were derived numerically for 231 computational efficiency and based on analytical expressions (see Supplementary  232 Material), matched the results of stochastic simulations (we show results analogous to 233 the middle column of Fig 4 in Fig S1) . often overlooked, factor in the dynamics of a newly introduced high-virulence (HV) 242 pathogen strain is partial immunity driven by exposures to related pathogen strains. 243
When a HV pathogen strain arrives in a population following an epidemic of a related 244 but low virulence (LV) strain, the probability of a major epidemic of the HV strain is 245 decreased. High rates of travel between spatially distinct subpopulations can drive 246 larger outbreaks of low virulence pathogens, in turn providing higher levels of immunity 247 if/when a HV strain, which has the potential to cause a devastating epidemic, appears in 248 the population (Fig 4a-c) . 249 250 Not only did we find that the probability of a major epidemic of the HV strain decreases 251 when travel between subpopulations increases, but the expected final size of the HV 252 strain outbreak can also be reduced. This was particularly pronounced when the level of 253 cross-immunity between strains was high (Fig 4i) , since lower cross-immunity levels 254 combined with high travel rates can lead to large epidemics due to increased mixing 255 between subpopulations (Fig 4g) . When between-subpopulation travel was increased, 256 the reduction in the probability of a major epidemic of the HV strain, and the expected 257 size, was largely due to cross-immunity reducing the proportion of outbreaks that 258 proceeded to become major epidemics. If/when major epidemics occurred, we found 259 that they were typically larger when there was more travel between regions (Fig 4d-e) , 260 although this was not always the case, particularly when the level of cross-immunity 261 was very high (Fig 4f) . 262 263 Partial cross-immunity against a highly virulent strain from prior exposure to a less 264 virulent strain is characteristic of influenza outbreaks in different seasons. For example, 265 it has been suggested that individuals born before 1890 were protected against the 266 1918 H1N1 pandemic due to the outbreak in 1889-90 [33] and that individuals infected 267 with multiple historical seasonal H1N1 influenza strains were protected against the 2009 268 H1N1 influenza pandemic strain [34] . Our results suggest that cross-immunity might be 269 a potential explanatory factor as to why there has not been a pandemic as devastating 270
as the 1918 influenza epidemic in the century since, despite the emergence of a strain 271 antigenically similar to the 1918 pandemic strain in 2009. Travel rates increased 272 substantially during the 20 th century. As a theoretical exercise, we obtained crude 273 estimates of the travel rates from Europe to the USA, comparing rates during the early 274 20th century with current travel rates. For the early 20 th century rates, we used registry active than ever before [41] . We also note that, while we focussed on cross-immunity 302 between different pathogen strains, a related concept is protection against reinfection 303 with the same (or very similar) strain -often referred to as homologous interference or 304 superinfection exclusion -which has been demonstrated for a number of pathogens of 305 plants or animals [42] . 306
We aimed here to develop the simplest model possible characterising the spread of a 308 pathogen between spatially distinct populations. For assessing the probability of a major 309 epidemic of a specific virulent strain of a pathogen in a particular host population, the 310 model would need to be extended and adjusted. For example, the process of mutation 311 of the pathogen from the low virulence strain to the high virulence strain may have to be 312 modelled explicitly. If the mutation occurs a long period after the previous major 313 epidemic of the non-virulent strain, cross-immunity might be expected to have waned 314 compared to if the low and high virulent strain epidemics occur in quick succession. The 315 cumulative effects of a number of past outbreaks of different related strains might also 316 have to be considered when a high virulence strain enters a host population [25, 34] . 317
Different types of partial cross-immunity could be considered. Here we have assumed 318 that exposure to the LV strain reduces the probability of infection with the HV strain, 319
whereas for some infections cross-immunity may instead (or also) act to reduce the 320 severity of disease [43, 44] . As an example, epidemiological isolation leading to high 321 mortality rates of infections may explain the mass mortality in pacific island populations 322 between the 16 th and 19 th centuries [45] . 323 324 Nonetheless, we have demonstrated the principle that increased global travel might not 325 necessarily mean that large pandemics are more likely in the present day than 326 previously. On the contrary, our results demonstrate that there may exist conditions 327 under which increased travel between subpopulations might reduce the probability and 328 size of major epidemics. The size of an epidemic of an entirely new pathogen, or a 329 strain that is antigenically distinct from previous circulating strains, is likely to be larger 330 when there is more travel. This is because the pathogen would then be entering a 331 population that is immunologically naïve and additional mixing provides the opportunity 332 for more transmission events. However, we have focussed on epidemics occurring due 333 to variants of pre-existing pathogens since these have driven a substantial number of 334 past pandemics. Predicting which pathogen is likely to cause the next major pandemic 335 is challenging [46] . Our study has led us to support the assertion of the World Health 336
Organisation that the pandemic threat is greatest from an unknown strain of a known previous LV strain outbreak, we also assumed that individuals travelled between 387 subpopulations at rate ߣ per day (see Fig 1) . When we considered the full model, consisting of two subpopulations (denoted 1 and 2), 438
we assumed without loss of generality that the LV strain arrived in subpopulation 1. 439
Since we were only interested in the effect of cross-immunity on outbreaks of the HV 440 strain, we assumed that the LV strain successfully invaded the population. As a result, a 441 major epidemic of the LV strain occurred in subpopulation 1. 442 443 Eight outcomes were then possible (see Table S1 ). A major epidemic of the LV strain 444 may or may not occur in subpopulation 2. Then, major epidemics of the HV may or may 445 not occur in each of subpopulations 1 and 2. Calculation of the probabilities of each of 446 these outcomes, as well as the expected numbers of individuals infected by the LV and 447 HV strains in each subpopulation, are described in the Supplementary Material. 448 449
